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This article marks the 30th anniversary of the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s 
Baby M decision by offering a critical analysis of surrogacy policy in the United States. 
Despite fundamental changes in both science and society since the case was decided, 
state courts and legislatures remain bitterly divided on the legality of surrogacy. In 
arguing for a more uniform, permissive legal posture toward surrogacy, the article 
addresses five central debates in the surrogacy literature.  
First, should the legal system accommodate those seeking conception through 
surrogacy, or should it prohibit such arrangements? Second, if surrogacy is permitted, 
what steps can be taken to minimize the potential exploitation of women who are willing 
to rent their wombs for income? Third, what criteria should govern the eligibility to 
serve as a surrogate mother and an intended parent? Fourth, what principle(s) should 
serve as the basis for determining the parentage of children born through surrogacy? 
Fifth, is regulatory uniformity in the surrogacy realm desirable? Is it achievable?  
The article concludes that courts and legislatures should accept the validity of 
surrogacy contracts, determine parentage according to intent, and identify transparent 
criteria for the eligibility of both surrogates and intended parents.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 3, 1988, the Supreme Court of New Jersey invalidated a 
contractual agreement between William and Elizabeth Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead.1 
The Sterns wanted a baby but believed they could not safely conceive; Whitehead 
wanted to give “the ‘gift of life’.”2 Their contract stipulated that Whitehead would be 
inseminated with William Stern’s semen, gestate the baby, and surrender it to the Sterns 
for a fee of $10,000.3  
The court’s rejection of the surrogacy contract did not signal a concern that 
Whitehead had signed it under duress, or lacked the mental capacity to understand the 
contractual terms.4 Nor was the court worried about misrepresentation. Instead, in the 
court’s judgment,  
[t]he surrogacy contract is based on principles that are directly 
contrary to the objectives of our laws. It guarantees the separation of 
a child from its mother; it looks to adoption regardless of suitability; 
it totally ignores the child; it takes the child from the mother regardless 
of her wishes and her maternal fitness; and it does all of this…through 
the use of money.5  
“There are in a civilized society,” the court concluded, “some things that money cannot 
buy.”6  
For the past three decades, the Baby M case has cast a shadow over the 
regulation of surrogate motherhood in the United States, despite fundamental changes 
in both science and society. Scientifically, the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s opinion 
was shaped by the fact that Ms. Whitehead was the biological mother of Baby M. 
Because her gamete was fertilized by Mr. Stern’s sperm, the court had little difficulty 
considering Whitehead the “real” mother of the baby (as illustrated by the quote above). 
In contrast, surrogacy arrangements today predominantly use gametes supplied by the 
intended mother or an anonymous donor, not the surrogate mother.7 As a result, the 
biological link between surrogate mothers and the babies they gestate is significantly 
weaker now than it was in the case of Baby M.8 
Sociologically, when Baby M was conceived three decades ago, those seeking 
surrogates were most likely to be married, heterosexual, infertile couples. Today, 
married, heterosexual couples like the Sterns continue to use surrogate mothers, but so 
do same-sex married couples, unmarried couples (both heterosexual and same-sex), and 
individuals, sometimes using donated eggs, donated sperm, or both. As Elisabeth 
Schwartz observes: 
                                                     
1 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
2 Id. at 1236. 
3 Id. at 1234. 
4 Id. at 1249. 
5 Id. at 1250. 
6 Id. at 1249. 
7 Surrogacy that uses the surrogate’s gamete is called traditional surrogacy, and is now much less 
common than gestational surrogacy, in which the surrogate mother does not supply a gamete. See Mark 
Hansen, As Surrogacy Becomes More Popular, Legal Problems Proliferate, ABA JOURNAL ONLINE (Mar. 
2011), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/as_surrogacy_becomes_more_popular_legal_problems_prolife
rate [https://perma.cc/HX9V-CC49]. 
8 In vitro fertilization (“IVF”) and intracytoplasmic sperm injection are the most common methods.  
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Times sure have changed. Members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) community are enjoying ever-increasing 
acceptance in many parts of the developed world. As cultural barriers 
and legal restrictions that have obstructed the parenting dreams of 
LGBT people gradually loosen, the desire to become parents is no 
longer a far-off fantasy. Today, same-sex couples are more able to 
avail themselves of family-formation options including adoption and 
assisted reproductive technology . . . .9 
Indeed, almost 20% of all same sex couples in the U.S. are currently raising children, 
some of which were born through surrogacy.10 
In addition to the scientific and sociological changes that have occurred since 
the Baby M decision, courts and legislatures across the United States have articulated a 
wide range of legal approaches to surrogacy.11 In the 1993 case of Johnson v. Calvert, 
involving a zygote formed from the egg and sperm of the intended parents, the California 
Supreme Court found the intended mother to be the child’s “legal, natural” mother, and 
held that the surrogacy contract was not “inconsistent with public policy.”12 In contrast, 
in 1992, the New York Legislature passed a law stating that “surrogate parenting 
contracts are hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void and 
unenforceable.”13 Beyond New York and California, some states limit intended 
surrogate parents to married couples, others place sharp restrictions on who can serve as 
a surrogate, a few prohibit payment to surrogates, and still others have been silent about 
surrogacy in both legislation and case law.14 Globally, nations have adopted widely 
divergent approaches to surrogacy, from prohibition to acceptance. All the while, 
infertility rates among women in the U.S. hover at approximately 12%, and surrogacy 
has become “a booming, global business.”15 
There is no better way to mark the 30th anniversary of the Baby M decision than 
to reevaluate the legal status of surrogate motherhood. This article looks back at the 
debate over surrogacy triggered by the Baby M case, and analyzes five central issues 
that continue to divide scholars, policymakers, and the public. It argues that the varied 
and often opaque domestic and global regulation of surrogacy fails those who seek 
children through surrogacy, those who serve as surrogates, those born to surrogate 
mothers, and society more generally. To combat those failures, the article calls for more 
                                                     
9 Elizabeth F. Schwartz, LGBT Issues in Surrogacy: Present and Future Challenges, in HANDBOOK 
OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY: INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL PRACTICE AND POLICY ISSUES 55 (E. Scott Sills 
ed., 2016). 
10 Id. 
11 For a review of different state approaches, see SUSAN MARKENS, Unity, Divisions, and Strange 
Bedfellows: Divergent Legislative Responses to Surrogate Motherhood, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AND 
THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 139, 139-70 (2007). 
12 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993). 
13 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 122 (McKinney 2010). Under New York law, parties, “[a] birth mother 
or her husband, a genetic father and his wife, and, if the genetic mother is not the birth mother, the genetic 
mother and her husband who violate this section shall be subject to a civil penalty . . .” N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 
§ 123 (McKinney 2010). 
14 See CTR. FOR BIOETHICS & CULTURE NETWORK, STATE-BY-STATE SURROGACY SUMMARY 
(2012), http://www.cbc-network.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/State-by-State_Surrogacy_Sum_CBC.pdf. 
(detailing surrogacy laws in all fifty states and the District of Columbia). 
15 PERMANENT BUREAU OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Private 
International Law Issues Surrounding the Status of Children, Including Issues Arising from International 
Surrogacy Arrangements 11 (2011), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/f5991e3e-0f8b-430c-b030-
ca93c8ef1c0a.pdf.  
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consistent and permissive regulation of surrogacy. As noted by the author of an 
influential book on assisted reproductive technology:  
. . . inconsistency and variation together carry a steep price. Because 
they make surrogacy a riskier endeavor than it need be: riskier for the 
intending parents, who, even in liberal states like California, don’t 
fully know whether their contracts are enforceable; and riskier for the 
surrogates, who don’t have the same kinds of protection that prevail 
in other endeavors.16 
No one wins when questions of parentage end up in court, babies are left stateless, 
contractual agreements between intended and surrogate parents are contested, and 
borders between states and nations are gamed in an effort to find a suitable regulatory 
environment for one’s procreative preferences. Moving beyond three decades of legal 
limbo and developing a coherent, consistent, and ethical approach to the regulation of 
surrogacy is the best way to celebrate the 30-year milestone of Baby M.  
Parts II-VI of the article address the following five questions. First, should the 
legal system accommodate those seeking conception through surrogacy, or should it 
prohibit such arrangements? Second, if surrogacy is permitted, what steps can be taken 
to minimize the potential exploitation of women who are willing to rent their wombs for 
income, and to ensure that surrogacy does not inappropriately commodify reproduction? 
Third, what criteria should govern the eligibility to serve as a surrogate mother and an 
intended parent? Fourth, what principle(s) should serve as the basis for determining the 
parentage of children born through surrogacy? Fifth, is regulatory uniformity in the 
surrogacy realm desirable and is it achievable? These are difficult questions, and 
addressing them fully in a short article is not possible. Instead, the article takes note of 
the major issues, highlights the range of arguments made by advocates of different 
positions, underscores the strongest of those arguments, and argues that after three 
decades of debate it is time for a more proactive legal response to surrogacy that moves 
beyond current academic disagreements. Rather than another 30 years of debate, the 
United States needs a more consistent regulatory posture—one that accepts the validity 
of surrogacy contracts, determines parentage according to intent, and identifies criteria 
for the eligibility of both surrogates and intended parents. Part VII offers a brief 
conclusion. 
II. ACCEPTANCE OR PROHIBITION? 
As Richard Storrow pointed out in a recent review of surrogacy in the U.S., 
“the legislative trend, if there is one, is toward legalizing surrogacy where it has been 
illegal, or providing a statutory framework for it where it has been practiced with 
minimal legislative guidance.”17 There are a number of reasons why one should 
welcome this trend. First, as noted above, collective ideas about what constitutes a 
couple, and a family, have changed dramatically in the past several decades, underscored 
by the legalization of same-sex marriage.18 Many same-sex couples, heterosexual 
couples, and individuals desire children but are unable to conceive. For them, surrogacy 
offers a route to parenthood, often to children with whom they have at least some genetic 
                                                     
16 DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE 
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 94 (2006). 
17 Richard Storrow, Surrogacy: American Style, in SURROGACY, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 193, 
193-216 (Paula Gerber & Katie O’Byrne eds., 2015). 
18 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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link. Absent a compelling reason to deny them the opportunity to parent a child, the laws 
around surrogacy should be structured to facilitate rather than to thwart their desires.  
Second, as a basic matter of social justice, one must be attentive to the gap 
between those able to pay the costs associated with surrogacy, and those who lack the 
financial resources to afford such an arrangement. The current patchwork of regulations 
in the U.S. means that in many cases intended parents must travel to, and spend 
significant time in, a state with permissive surrogacy laws.19 In other cases, they leave 
the U.S. in search of surrogates abroad.20 More uniform acceptance of surrogacy in the 
U.S. will make it more widely available, and will consequently decrease the gap between 
those who can afford to enter into a surrogacy arrangement and those who cannot.  
Third, and more pragmatically, the genie is already out of the bottle. Over the 
past 30 years, the urge to procreate has proven sufficiently strong, and those intent on 
hiring a surrogate mother have not hesitated to cross state or national borders in order to 
find one.21 With the increasing availability and decreasing cost of ARTs globally, it is 
simply too late to effectively prohibit those who want children from entering into some 
form of a surrogacy arrangement. Banning surrogacy in some states simply pushes 
people to make surrogacy arrangements in surrogacy-friendly states; banning it in all 
states would trigger an increase in gestational tourism, a practice in which intended 
parents hire surrogates in countries with permissive surrogacy laws that may offer only 
limited legal protections to surrogates, leaving them prone to coercion and 
exploitation.22 Similarly, when surrogacy is unavailable, demand for alternative means 
                                                     
19 See Tamar Lewin, Surrogates and Couples Face a Maze of Laws, State by State, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/us/surrogates-and-couples-face-a-maze-of-laws-state-
by-state.html (“There is nothing resembling a national consensus on how to handle [surrogacy] . . . and no 
federal law, leaving the states free to do as they wish.”); Gestational Surrogacy Law Across the United States: 
State-by-State Interactive Map for Commercial Surrogacy, CREATIVE FAMILY CONNECTIONS, 
https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-map/ [https://perma.cc/A99U-7JFN]. 
20 See As Demand for Surrogacy Soars, More Countries Are Trying to Ban It, THE ECONOMIST 
(May 13, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/international/21721926-many-feminists-and-religious-
leaders-regard-it-exploitation-demand-surrogacy [https://perma.cc/FPU5-3EEH]; Cheaper Overseas: 
Surrogate Mothers, ABC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=3664065 
[https://perma.cc/54RE-T88R]; see also Darlena Cunha, The Hidden Costs of International Surrogacy, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/the-hidden-costs-of-
international-surrogacy/382757/ [https://perma.cc/2AQY-VD3H]; Danielle Preiss & Pragati Shahi, The 
Dwindling Options for Surrogacy Abroad, THE ATLANTIC (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/05/dwindling-options-for-surrogacy-abroad/484688/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q9AH-2Y3W]; Ari Shapiro, Surrogate Parenting: A Worldwide Industry, Lacking Global 
Rules, NPR (June 11, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/06/ 11/413406325/surrogate-
parenting-a-worldwide-industry-lacking-global-rules [https://perma.cc/A8HZ-VDEM] (detailing the use of 
surrogates abroad). 
21 See Tamara Audi & Arlene Chang, Assembling the Global Baby, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2010), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703493504576007774155273928; see also Susan 
Donaldson James, Infertile Americans Go to India for Gestational Surrogates, ABC News (Nov. 7, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/infertile-americans-india-gestational-surrogates/story?id=20808125 
[https://perma.cc/8DLE-MDGR]; Tamar Lewin, Surrogates and Couples Face a Maze of Laws, State by State, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/us/surrogates-and-couples-face-a-maze-
of-laws-state-by-state.html?_r=0; Douglas Pet, Make Me a Baby As Fast As You Can, SLATE (Jan. 9, 2012), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2012/01/reproductive_tourism_how_surrogacy_provider_pl
anethospital_speeds_up_pregnancies_and_lowers_costs_.html [https://perma.cc/D67N-TL7K] (discussing 
the lengths some people will go to have a child). 
22 Martha Field, Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1155, 1181-82 (2014) (noting that 
“attempts to forbid surrogacy are likely to result either in travel for surrogacy or in a robust black market… 
once the public knows that surrogacy can be accomplished as a scientific matter, it will be practiced, legally 
or illegally”); see also Sheela Saravanan, Addressing Global Inequalities in Surrogacy, in HANDBOOK OF 
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY: INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL PRACTICE AND POLICY ISSUES (E. Scott Sills, ed., 
2016). 
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of bearing children, like uterine transplants, will increase, imposing higher costs and 
greater risks on individuals and couples.23  
Fourth, the legal system is well-equipped to manage surrogacy. A more 
permissive legal stance toward surrogacy requires that contracts between surrogate 
mothers and intended parents be encouraged and enforced.24 Of course, enforcing a 
surrogacy contract does not mean that surrogates will be forced to do certain things they 
may find objectionable. Surrogate mothers cannot be denied their constitutional right to 
an abortion, for example, or be forced to abide by contractual terms that micromanage 
their behavior, like requiring them to adhere to a particular exercise regimen.25 Indeed, 
contracts governing surrogacy agreements are prime examples of relational contracts, in 
which specific contractual terms are informed by social norms, informal understandings, 
and emotions.26 Nonetheless, although specific performance may not always be 
required, surrogacy contracts must be legally enforceable, meaning surrogate mothers 
will be held to contractual terms that require them to give up their parental rights and 
relinquish the children they gestate.27 
For 30 years, scholars have debated the merits and pitfalls of surrogacy, and 
they could easily do so for another 30.28 There are serious issues at the heart of the debate 
about which people are likely to remain divided; premising policy action on substantive 
consensus is a guarantee of inaction. Instead, while debates about contracts, 
commodification, and exploitation continue, policymakers must weigh the relative costs 
of action versus inaction. Policies permitting surrogacy are not cost-free, but they 
represent the most acceptable way forward.29 As Elizabeth Scott wrote in her survey of 
legal and social issues surrounding surrogacy in the 20 years after the Baby M case, 
“well-designed regulation can greatly mitigate most of the potential tangible harms of 
surrogacy, and this would seem to be the appropriate function of law in a liberal society 
in response to an issue on which no societal consensus exists.”30 
III. MITIGATING EXPLOITATION AND COMMODIFICATION 
                                                     
23 John A. Robertson, Other Women’s Wombs: Uterus Transplants and Gestational Surrogacy, 3 
J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 68, 68 (2016). 
24 See generally, I. Glenn Cohen & Katherine L. Kraschel, Gestational Surrogacy Agreements: 
Enforcement and Breach, in HANDBOOK OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY: INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL 
PRACTICE AND POLICY ISSUES (E. Scott Sills, ed., 2016) (providing a general discussion of surrogacy contracts 
and enforcement). 
25 MARTHA FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 79 (1988) (stating “it seems unimaginable that the 
law would enforce a contract to undergo an abortion”). 
26 Hillary L. Berk, The Legalization of Emotion: Managing Risk by Managing Feelings in 
Contracts for Surrogate Labor, 49 L. & SOC’Y REV. 143, 148 (2015). 
27 Field, supra note 25 at 79 (arguing that personal service contracts are not enforceable by specific 
performance. But once the baby is born, says Field, the idea that a personal service contract cannot be enforced 
by specific performance is no longer helpful to a surrogate, because performance has been completed, so this 
would be like the transfer of a completed object). 
28 See FRANCE WINDDANCE TWINE, OUTSOURCING THE WOMB (2011) (giving a recent, thoughtful 
analysis of surrogacy, comparatively). 
29 For a detailed argument for how regulating surrogacy can work effectively to protect the interests 
of intended parents and surrogates, see Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial 
Intimacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1223, 1227 (2013) (arguing “that in transactions of commercial intimacy such as 
surrogate motherhood, regulation should be formulated that respects the benefits of commercial transaction 
while taking seriously the relational intimacy and potential exploitation involved in surrogate motherhood.”).  
30 Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
109, 146 (2009). 
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A. EXPLOITATION 
What can be done to best ensure that surrogate motherhood does not exploit 
poor women who are willing to serve as surrogate mothers because they are desperate 
for cash? As a starting point, it should be acknowledged that in almost all cases surrogate 
mothers will be less financially secure than the intended parent(s) for whom they are 
gestating a child.31 Financial inequality however, does not necessarily lead to financial 
exploitation. The important question is whether those who serve as surrogates agree to 
do so out of financial desperation, and thus lack any bargaining power when entering a 
contractual relationship. Do they have other income options? Are their human rights 
being violated by limiting their activities, food choices, or ability to terminate their 
pregnancy while serving as surrogates?32  
Qualitative studies of surrogate mothers indicate that contrary to the claims of 
scholars who describe surrogate mothers as most likely to be poor, single, ethnic 
minorities, surrogates are generally white, often married, and usually financially 
stable.33 Whereas Anita Allen paints a bleak picture of “a new, virulent, form of racial 
and class discrimination,” in which “thousands of poor and minority women will likely 
be used as a ‘breeder class,’” the reality is that “women of color are greatly under-
represented as surrogate mothers.”34 Significantly, a comprehensive review of the 
empirical literature on surrogate mothers concludes that “surrogate mothers are mature, 
experienced, stable, self-aware, extroverted non-conformists who make the initial 
decision that surrogacy is something that they want to do.”35 Importantly, it does not 
find that surrogate mothers in the U.S. are exploited, or are unable to meaningfully 
consent to being surrogates.36  
Perhaps the empirical literature paints a misleadingly positive picture of 
surrogate mothers in the United States, but it is the most accurate picture currently 
available, and it should at the very least call into question some of the negative 
assumptions and stereotypes about surrogacy. Outside of the U.S. and other 
industrialized democracies, however, there is greater cause for concern. For those who 
desire children but find the American regulatory climate and cost prohibitive, gestational 
tourism is an oft-traveled path. Countries that are destinations for such gestational 
tourism are generally economically underdeveloped, and expose women to the 
possibility of exploitation.37 Weak legal protections make surrogates vulnerable to 
contractual clauses that control their behavior in a variety of circumstances; surrogates 
may be housed in dehumanizing communal shelters; and the payment offered to 
                                                     
31 One can imagine a health insurance system that fully covered the costs of surrogacy, and which 
as a result made such services available regardless of the assets of intended parents. But that is not currently 
the case.  
32 For a detailed examination of surrogacy in India, see generally AMRITA PANDE, WOMBS IN 
LABOR: TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY IN INDIA (2014).  
33 Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting The Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist Theory Meets 
Empirical Research on Surrogate Motherhood, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 13, 34, 40-41 (2010). For a thoughtful 
review of the empirical literature on surrogacy, see Lina Peng, Surrogate Mothers: An Exploration of the 
Empirical and the Normative, 21 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 555, 560-561 (2013). 
34 Anita L. Allen, The Socio-Economic Struggle for Equality: The Black Surrogate Mother, 8 
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 17 (1991); see also Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough 
Waters: An Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 21, 31 (2005). 
35 Busby & Vun, supra note 33, at 25. 
36 Id. at 46. 
37 PANDE, supra note 32, at 172-73; Raywat Deonandan, Recent Trends in Reproductive Tourism 
and International Surrogacy: Ethical Considerations and Challenges for Policy, 8 RISK MGMT. & 
HEALTHCARE POL’Y 111 (2015). 
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surrogates can be egregiously low.38 The concerns that fuel opposition to surrogacy in 
the U.S. are thus significantly magnified in places where some Americans desirous of 
children have sought surrogates, like India, Thailand, Ukraine, and Mexico.39 
To the extent that concerns remain about the exploitation of surrogate mothers 
both within and outside of the U.S., they can be addressed partially by ensuring that 
surrogates have their own legal representation. Such representation can be paid for by 
agencies offering surrogacy services, with the cost passed through to intended parents. 
By guaranteeing that surrogates are able to consult with attorneys who can help them to 
understand the terms of their surrogacy contracts, advocate for adequate compensation, 
and help to protect their individual rights, opportunities for the exploitation of surrogates 
will be greatly reduced.40 Concerns about the exploitation of surrogates overseas may 
also be addressed by advocating for a more permissive legal regime for surrogacy in the 
United States. Reducing demand for gestational tourism will decrease the potential for 
coercion and exploitation that too often threatens to undermine international surrogacy 
arrangements. 
B. COMMODIFICATION 
Feminists, medical ethicists, legal scholars, human rights advocates, and others 
have articulated thoughtful arguments not only about the potential exploitation of 
vulnerable women whose economic circumstances drive them to work as surrogates, but 
also about what they consider to be the unpalatable commodification of reproduction 
that results from paying someone to bear a child.41 Such objections are difficult to 
counter, because they focus on a type of harm that is challenging to sharply define. As 
Elizabeth Scott notes, “the harms of commodification are abstract and not subject to 
empirical validation. How could it be determined whether surrogacy has changed the 
way that children or women’s reproductive capacity is valued?”42  
One can proffer data about the economic conditions of surrogates that defies 
claims that surrogacy takes advantage of lower income women, and one can empirically 
study the financial arrangements between surrogates and intended parents to 
demonstrate that they represent reasonable contractual terms. But data about the material 
conditions of surrogacy will do little to persuade those whose concerns are less about 
money per se than about surrogacy’s impact on how society values and understands 
human reproduction. With what sort of evidence can one refute the claim that a 
contractual relationship between surrogates and intended parents inevitably turns 
                                                     
38 Normann Witzleb & Anurag Chawla, Surrogacy in India: Strong Demand, Weak Laws, in 
SURROGACY, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Paula Gerber & Katie O’Byrne eds., 2015).  
39 Id. 
40 Parties to surrogacy arrangements would also be well served by building into their contracts 
some form of alternative dispute resolution. Litigation may loom as a possibility when relationships sour, but 
mediation (for example) is likely to be a faster, less costly, and more satisfactory way of handling conflicts. 
Keeping conflicts out of court will also avoid a sticky jurisdictional issue—whose jurisdiction governs 
surrogacy contracts, and where should conflicts be litigated.  
41 See, e.g., Jennifer A. Parks, Gestational Surrogacy and the Feminist Perspective, in HANDBOOK 
OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY: INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL PRACTICE AND POLICY ISSUES 25 (E. Scott Sills, 
ed., 2016). Parks contrasts the views of feminist care ethicists and liberal feminists, noting that “there are a 
number of feminist perspectives on the rising practice of gestational commercial surrogacy (both domestic 
and international) that lead to differing conclusions about the morality of the practice.”  
42 Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
109, 125 (2009) (“The framing of surrogacy as commodification was shaped and promoted by feminists and 
religious leaders who amplified its social meaning as baby-selling and the exploitation of women. These 
groups were driven by different ideological and political goals, but they forged an effective political alliance 
that played an important role in shaping the law for years to come.”).  
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women into baby production machines? What data—quantitative or qualitative—speaks 
to the concern that offering payment to a woman to bear a child does not necessarily 
turn babies into fungible commercial products?43  
Perhaps the most compelling response to those who worry about 
commodification is to point out that those who support surrogacy most decidedly do not 
support baby selling. What is the difference? Baby selling is just that—put a price tag 
on the good (a child) and sell it to someone willing to meet the asking price. The money 
exchanged is explicitly for the purchase of the child, just like the money one pays for a 
car is for the acquisition of a car. Surrogacy arrangements do not involve putting a price 
on a baby, but instead focus on paying surrogate mothers for their medical care, lost 
wages, health insurance, and more. As Glenn Cohen convincingly writes, 
“compensation for the medical costs and lost wages of a mother in a surrogacy contract 
is different from buying children or commercial surrogacy. The former transactions 
recognize that the money is not a substitute for the child—that some value remains 
uncompensated—whereas the latter do not.”44  
If the concern about commodification and surrogacy is that any money is 
changing hands, then all one can do is to point out that procreation in the 21st century 
does not simply involve the coupling of a man and a woman. It is shaped by a wide 
variety of factors—science, technology, social norms, explicit policy choices, and 
perhaps most of all, the market. Starting well before a woman becomes pregnant and 
continuing well past the birth of a child, the conception, gestation, and birth of a child 
implicates a wide range of expensive technologies and carries a broad array of costs. 
Some may bemoan the marriage of the market with human conception, and there are 
surely some reasons for concern. But even if there is desire to go back to the halcyon 
days of simple human reproduction (if they ever existed) it is too late to do so, and it 
would be unwise to reject surrogacy for involving the same sort of financial transaction 
that characterized the entire procreative process.45  
IV. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA 
A third foundational issue concerns the eligibility criteria for both surrogates 
and intended parents. What types of legal limitations, if any, should be imposed on those 
who desire to have a child through surrogacy? What about the requirements for those 
who want to serve as surrogates? Across the U.S., and globally, there are a number of 
limitations on intended parents. Most frequently, they exclude individuals, and/or same 
sex couples, and/or unmarried couples from becoming intended parents. The 
justification for such limitations is not generally articulated, perhaps because making a 
logical case for their appropriateness is difficult, but the underlying view appears to be 
that married, heterosexual couples provide the “best” environment for raising children. 
Regardless of such stereotypes, there is no reason why marital status or sexual 
                                                     
43 Id. at 112 (“Critics [of surrogate motherhood] claimed that surrogacy degraded children and 
women by treating children as commodities to be exchanged for profit and women’s bodies as childbearing 
factories; the arrangements also degraded the mother–child relationship by paying women not to bond with 
their children.”). 
44 I. Glenn Cohen, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the Commodification 
Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 707 (2003). 
45 SPAR, supra note 16. See MARTHA ERTMAN, RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND 
READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE (2005); MICHELLE B. GOODWIN, BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW 
POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES, (2010); Margaret Jane Radin, From Babyselling to Boilerplate: Reflections 
on the Limits of the Infrastructures of the Market, 54 OSGOODE HALL L. J. (forthcoming 2017). 
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orientation should be disqualifying for surrogacy, just as they are not disqualifying for 
same-sex couples seeking to adopt, or unmarried couples choosing to conceive.  
Still, not everyone is well-suited to being a surrogate parent. Ensuring that 
surrogacy is in the best interests of the child requires the identification of potentially 
disqualifying characteristics. In establishing eligibility criteria for adoption, the 
Children’s Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services is broadly 
inclusive: “Most people are eligible to adopt, regardless of whether they are married or 
single, their age, income, or sexual orientation. Having a disability does not 
automatically disqualify a prospective adoptive parent.”46 Nor is a criminal record 
disqualifying, unless it involves a child-related offense.47 During the 150-year history of 
adoption in the U.S., states have developed a relatively uniform set of criteria governing 
who may adopt.48 Those criteria establish a baseline, but more stringent standards should 
be imposed on intended surrogate parents, at least until surrogacy is a well-established 
practice. Protecting the best interests of children born through surrogacy counsels that 
intended parents be physically and psychologically stable, have no disqualifying 
criminal history (most misdemeanors are not disqualifying, whereas most felony 
convictions are), have the financial means to raise a healthy child, and do not abuse 
drugs or alcohol. Many surrogacy agencies impose at least some of these limitations, 
but a more uniform approach to the eligibility of intended parents would underscore the 
importance of the best interests of the child in surrogacy arrangements.49 
Determining who can act as a surrogate mother owes less to adoption and more 
to the accumulated experience of different jurisdictions and organizations that have 
regulated and offered surrogacy services. Although there is some variation, among the 
most widely used criteria are that women serving as surrogates must have previously 
given birth to (and in some cases, raised) a child; must be between 21 and 40, must be 
financially stable (often meaning that they cannot be living in state-sponsored housing 
and must have private medical insurance), must have a healthy lifestyle (no smoking or 
drug use), and must be U.S. citizens or legal residents.50 The requirements for serving 
as a surrogate mother have in general been less controversial than those for being an 
intended parent.51 Of the many concerns that plague the regulation of surrogacy, they 
represent an area of relative calm. 
                                                     
46 Who Can Adopt?, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY (2016), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/adoption/adoptive/whocan/ [https://perma.cc/BD4B-8MU8]. Although 
there are many differences between surrogacy and adoption, when it comes to evaluating who qualifies as a 
suitable parent, the issues are quite similar. 
47 Id. 
48 In 1851, Massachusetts was the first state to pass an adoption law. Timeline of Adoption History, 
THE ADOPTION HISTORY PROJECT (2012), http://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/timeline.html 
[https://perma.cc/KM53-M3BK]. 
49 Justice Kennard’s dissent in Johnson v. Calvert argues that the best interests of the child standard 
should be used to determine parentage on a case by case basis. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 788-801 
(Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting). But, it is more useful to rely on that standard when establishing eligibility 
criteria for intended parents.  
50 See, e.g., Celia Burrell & Leroy C. Edozien, The Ideal Surrogate: Santa Claus, Easter Bunny, 
or Tooth Fairy?, in HANDBOOK OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY: INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL PRACTICE AND 
POLICY ISSUES 9 (E. Scott Sills ed., 2016); Surrogate Mother Requirements, SURROGATE ALTERNATIVES, 
https://www.surrogatealternatives.com/surrogate-mothers/surrogate-mother-requirements/ 
[https://perma.cc/2JNY-MCHT]. 
51 See Steven H. Snyder, Screening and Qualification of Intended Parents Participating in Third-
Party Reproduction, STEVEN H. SNYDER & ASSOCIATES ATTORNEYS AT LAW, 
https://www.snyderlawfirm.com/Articles/Screening-And-Qualification-Of-Intended-Parents-Participating-
In-Third-Party-Reproduction.shtml [https://perma.cc/8FYX-TLBK]. 
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V. DETERMINING PARENTAGE 
Who should be considered the legal parent(s) of a child born through 
surrogacy? In the Baby M case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had little difficulty in 
finding that Mr. Stern was the baby’s father.52 Determining motherhood was a more 
challenging task, at least in part because Mrs. Stern was the intended mother but was 
not biologically related to Baby M, whereas Mary Beth Whitehead provided her gamete 
and gestated the baby.53 In the court’s view, Whitehead was the mother; Mrs. Stern could 
only become Baby M’s legal mother through adoption.54  
A somewhat different conflict over parenthood arose in the Baby Mukai case, 
in which a Japanese media personality, Aki Mukai, and her professional wrestler 
husband, Nobuhiko Takada, arranged for a surrogate to bear their child.55 A de facto ban 
on surrogacy in Japan led Mukai and Takada to find a jurisdiction that would allow them 
to contract with a surrogate mother.56 They chose Nevada, where in 2003 two embryos 
created with Mukai’s eggs and Takada’s sperm were implanted in a surrogate.57 Unlike 
Whitehead, Cindy (the surrogate) willingly relinquished the babies, and Mukai and 
Takada obtained a birth certificate from Nevada listing them as the baby’s legal 
parents.58 When they returned to Japan with their twins, however, the Japanese 
government refused to recognize Mukai as the mother, triggering a legal conflict over 
parentage that languished until Mukai legally adopted the children five years later.59 
Baby M and Baby Mukai are just two examples of how surrogacy, together 
with in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), egg donation, and sperm donation, have reshaped 
conceptions of parenthood, and highlighted the distinction between genetic, gestational, 
and legal parentage. Who are the legal parents of a baby gestated by a surrogate when 
the intended parents have used a donated egg and the intended father’s sperm to create 
a zygote? What about when both the egg and sperm are donated? How will the use of 
artificial wombs affect the determination of legal parentage?60 In vitro gametogenesis 
(“IVG”), which enables the creation of both eggs and sperm from skin cells, further 
complicates the picture—not only can individuals in same-sex relationships both be 
genetically related to their child, but a single individual’s cells can be used to create both 
eggs and sperm.61 Equally challenging is “multiplex parenting,” involving a gamete 
derived from two people that is combined with a gamete from a third individual. “Would 
we view each of those three as equal genetic parents, or do we give greater rights and 
duties to the parent who contributed more genetic material?”62 When surrogacy and IVG 
are combined, the situation becomes even more vexing.  
                                                     
52 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1261 (N.J. 1988). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Yuri Hibino, Gestational Surrogacy in Japan, in HANDBOOK OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY: 
INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL PRACTICE AND POLICY ISSUES 177 (E. Scott Sills ed., 2016). 
56 Id. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. 
59 Id. 
60 Aarathi Prasad, How Artificial Wombs Will Change Our Ideas of Gender, Family and Equality, 
THE GUARDIAN (May 1, 2017, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/01/artificial-womb-gender-family-equality-lamb 
[https://perma.cc/3UJD-RFFN]. 
61 Tamar Lewin, Babies from Skin Cells? Prospect Is Unsettling to Some Experts, N.Y. TIMES (May 
16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/health/ivg-reproductive-technology.html. 
62 I. Glenn Cohen, George Q. Daley, and Eli Y. Adashi, Disruptive Reproductive Technologies, 9 
SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1, 3 (2017) (“IVG’s most disruptive impact might be on our very conception of 
parentage.”), 
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There are clearly no simple answers when it comes to determining parentage. 
Gestation, genetics, and social factors all matter, but which matters more, and how 
should courts adjudicate their relative importance when making decisions about legal 
parentage?63 In an article published in 1990, Marjorie Shultz argues that intent, as 
evidenced in contractual agreements or in other ways, should motivate the legal 
determination of parentage.64 In her view, if a person or persons desiring a child hire a 
surrogate, the agreement reveals an intent to parent the child, so the legal parent(s) of 
the child is/are the person/couple who hired the surrogate.65 As Shultz puts it, the  
legal rules governing modern procreative arrangements and parental 
status should recognize the importance and the legitimacy of 
individual efforts to project intentions and decisions into the future. 
Where such intentions are deliberate, explicit and bargained for, 
where they are the catalyst for reliance and expectations, as is the case 
in technologically-assisted reproductive arrangements, they should be 
honored.66  
In reaching its decision in Johnson v. Calvert, the California Supreme Court 
underscored that view, concluding that “she who intended to procreate the child -- that 
is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her 
own -- is the natural mother under California law.”67  
Intent is never a perfect solution; it is frequently ambiguous and contested. But 
it has a number of benefits. It moves beyond old and outmoded approaches to 
parenthood, which generally assume that biological, gestational, and legal parentage will 
overlap. It puts individuals, same-sex couples, heterosexual couples, and 
married/unmarried couples on equal footing by making clear that parenthood is a 
determination based on social, as well as, biological factors.68 And it takes into account 
the wide range of procreative choices that have been enabled by technological and 
sociological change, and that will continue to be enabled in the future.  
VI. LEGAL UNIFORMITY 
The fifth and final question this paper addresses is how to manage the cross-
border inconsistency of surrogacy laws and regulations. As Debora Spar notes,  
What the surrogacy market lacks . . . is any kind of clear and consistent 
regulatory framework. Instead it is pockmarked by legal and 
jurisdictional inconsistencies—by the sharp divisions that linger 
                                                     
63 As one author puts it, “[e]ssentially, the law has a choice: faced with new reproductive 
arrangements, it can recognize and facilitate emerging procreative choice and intentions about parenthood. Or 
it can cling to definitions and frameworks suited to a different biological and social reality, as did the New 
Jersey Supreme court in deciding Baby M.” Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based 
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 397 (1990). 
64 Id. at 397-398. 
65 Id. at 397. 
66 For two influential articles advocating intent-based parenthood, see John. H. Hill, What Does It 
Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 
(1991); Shultz, supra note 63. For a more critical view of intent as the basis of parenthood, see Richard F. 
Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Function Approach to Parentage, 53 
HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002). 
67 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) 
68 For an insightful historical analysis of parenthood that highlights its social dimensions, see 
generally Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260 (2017). 
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between states that prohibit payment for surrogacy and those that 
permit it; states that enforce surrogacy contracts and those that do not; 
and states that have specific regulations regarding the terms of 
surrogacy arrangements and those that are mute.69 
American-style federalism leaves a great many policy decisions in the hands of the 
states, including most of those involving health and welfare. A common justifications 
for this delegation of power was articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis in New State Ice 
Co. v. Liebmann, where he wrote in dissent: “It is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”70 In a recent article, Martha Field, an influential voice in the debate over 
surrogacy, echoed Brandeis’s approach, arguing that having different surrogacy laws in 
different states is advantageous because “the states and the public can learn from the 
implementation of different systems and will eventually have a better basis, including 
an empirical basis, for forming their surrogacy policy.”71 The idea of states as 
laboratories for democracy may be appealing, but at some point society must pause the 
collection of evidence and analyze the accumulated data. Is there any? Field says little 
about the empirical evidence gathered over the past three decades, and offers no 
indication that any state has changed its surrogacy policy on the basis of such empirical 
evidence.72 For the foreseeable future, it seems clear that states will continue to take 
divergent approaches to surrogacy, regardless of (or in the absence of) the evidence 
generated in state “laboratories.” Assuming that is true, is it a problem? And if so, what 
can be done?  
There are at least two reasons to be concerned about the divergent legal 
approaches to surrogacy embraced by different states. First, not all approaches to 
surrogacy are equally justifiable. To the contrary, some laws and regulations aimed at 
surrogacy are sounder than others.73 It is important, for example, for states to have 
surrogacy laws that do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or marital 
status. Legal protections ensuring that surrogate mothers are not exploited or coerced 
are essential. Contracts between intended parents and surrogates should be honored, not 
systematically rejected.74 Surrogacy regulations are not all created equal; after three 
decades of incompatible state regulation, it is time to make a choice.  
Second, regulatory diversity exacerbates those aspects of surrogacy that attract 
the most pointed criticism. To the extent that there are legitimate concerns about the 
exploitation of economically disadvantaged women and the commodification of both 
women and children, for example, the piecemeal regulation of surrogacy in the U.S. 
sharpens those worries. The divide between the haves and have nots—between those 
                                                     
69 See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE 
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 94 (2006). 
70 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 387 (1932). 
71 Field, supra note 22, at 1180. 
72 Id. 
73 One way to collect better data about surrogacy would be to require surrogacy agencies to create 
a database of surrogate mothers and intended parents and follow them from the inception of the surrogacy 
agreement until the child is ten years old. Surrogacy contracts could require parties to provide certain 
information during those years, and that information would provide a far better picture of surrogacy than is 
currently available.  
74 Enforcing surrogacy contracts may sometimes be at odds with the preferences of intended 
parents. If they change their minds and decide they do not want the child they bargained for (perhaps they do 
not want a child with a particular type of genetic defect, for example), they will still have to keep their end of 
the bargain, meaning that they must accept the child and tender full payment for the surrogacy arrangement.  
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with and without financial and educational resources—will inevitably be underscored if 
surrogacy is an option only for those who can figure out which states permit surrogacy, 
and then hire a surrogate in one of those states. The criticism becomes even sharper if 
one considers surrogacy options outside of the U.S.; gestational tourism is a prerogative 
of the well-off, and surrogacy outside of the U.S. is more likely to involve parties who 
lack basic legal protections.  
However conceived, surrogacy involves contracting out the gestation of one’s 
child. It is not cost-free, and those with greater resources will enjoy a greater range of 
options. But those facts alone do not mean that surrogacy should be rejected, assumed 
to be exploitative, or charged with commodifying the un-commodifiable. Instead, with 
careful regulatory choices and a configuration of laws within and among the fifty states 
that do not create or amplify preexisting inequities, surrogacy can offer a viable route to 
parenthood for those who might otherwise not be able to conceive.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The solution to the inconsistent legal treatment of surrogacy across the fifty 
states is easily stated but difficult to achieve—the creation of a (more) uniform 
regulatory approach to surrogacy.75 Instead of ad hoc decisions made by courts, state 
legislatures need to get more involved. As the court in In re Marriage of Buzzanca wrote: 
Again we must call on the Legislature to sort out the parental rights 
and responsibilities of those involved in artificial reproduction . . . . 
Courts can continue to make decisions on an ad hoc basis without 
necessarily imposing some grand scheme, looking to the imperfectly 
designed Uniform Parentage Act and a growing body of case law for 
guidance in the light of applicable family law principles. Or the 
Legislature can act to impose a broader order which, even though it 
might not be perfect on a case-by-case basis, would bring some 
predictability to those who seek to make use of artificial reproductive 
techniques.76 
Coordinating legislation in different states is a significant challenge. Various 
efforts have been, and continue to be, made to achieve some uniformity in the regulation 
of surrogacy, both within and beyond the U.S., but they have gained little traction.77 
Congress took an interest in regulating surrogacy in the late 1980s, largely with the 
intent to prohibit it, but that effort failed.78 Yet a more active Congressional posture is 
both possible and desirable. In an article exploring legislative approaches to surrogacy 
in the U.S., Alta Charo argues that the cross-border nature of surrogacy enables federal 
                                                     
75 Field, supra note 22, at 117 (arguing that uniform state laws are not necessary because the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause of the US Constitution guarantees that a “parent-child relationship established and 
recognized in one state must be respected in other states,” so the uniform “recognition of parent-child 
relationships is assured even while states pursue different surrogacy policies”).  
76 In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 280, 293 (Cal.Ct. App. 1998). 
77 Some scholars have argued that a more uniform approach to surrogacy could come from 
constitutional law, arguing that there is a constitutional right to surrogacy. Such arguments have generally 
been met with skepticism or disinterest. See Robertson, supra note 23. Field and others rejects claim that there 
is a constitutional right to surrogacy. Field, supra note 22, at 1177. 
78 Id. at 1176 n.120. See Commercialized Childbearing Act of 1989, H.R. 1188, 101st Cong. (1998); 
Anti-Surrogate Mother Act of 1989, H.R. 576, 101st Cong. (1989); Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1989, H.R. 
275, 101st Cong. (1989); Anti-Surrogate Mother Act of 1987, H.R. 3264, 100th Cong. (1987); Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act of 1987, H.R. 2433, 100th Cong. (1987). 
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government regulation on the basis of the Commerce Clause, and urges the government 
to press for the harmonization of state surrogacy laws.79 In her view, harmonization 
could be achieved thorough the development of standard contract provisions, making 
challenge grants available to states so that they can study legislative options, drafting a 
model law, or passing a joint resolution asking states to adopt a model law developed 
by a professional organization like the American Bar Association (“ABA”).80 Congress 
has thus far done none of those things, and the current political climate in the U.S. does 
not bode well for this type of bold political action. Nonetheless, federal government 
action is essential to the crafting of a more uniform legal approach to surrogacy in the 
states. 
Beyond Congress, some organizations have pressed for a consistent legal 
approach to surrogacy. In 1988, for example, the ABA’s Section of Family Law adopted 
the Model Surrogacy Act.81 The Act, primarily focused on traditional surrogacy 
arrangements, endorsed enforceable contractual surrogacy agreements, suggested that 
surrogates be compensated between $7,500 and $12,500, proposed a simplified 
procedure (as opposed to adoption) of awarding parentage to the intended parents, and 
envisioned the creation of state-licensed agencies to handle surrogacy.82 The Act has 
gone through a number of iterations, most recently in the 2008 Model Act Governing 
Assisted Reproductive Technology, which adopts and updates many of the provisions 
endorsed by the ABA 20 years earlier, including the validity of surrogacy contracts, the 
acceptability of paying surrogates a “reasonable fee”, and the legal parentage of the 
intended parents.83 Despite the ABA’s effort, there is little to suggest that it has had 
much influence. 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(“NCCUSL”) has also proposed legislation for regulating surrogacy, contained in 
Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”), but it has had a limited impact.84 Only 
11 states have adopted parts of the 2002 UPA, and just two (Texas and Utah) have 
enacted the surrogacy provisions of Article 8.85 In 2017 the NCCUSL recommendations 
for determining the parentage of children born through surrogacy were updated, but for 
now it is too early to know if that effort will have an impact on state policy. In short, 
despite the many challenges aspiring parents face when confronted by the current 
patchwork of state policies governing surrogacy, there is little indication that either the 
federal government or state governments will expend much effort to achieve a greater 
degree of policy harmonization.  
A similar lack of political will is evident globally, where one continues to 
observe a high degree of policy heterogeneity. In 2015, the Permanent Bureau of the 
                                                     
79 R. Alta Charo, Legislative Approaches to Surrogate Motherhood, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: 
POLITICS AND PRIVACY 88-119 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990). 
80 Id. 
81 See Draft ABA Model Surrogacy Act, 22 FAM. L. Q. 123 (1988). 
82 Id.; H. Joseph Gitlin, Family Law Section Approves Model Surrogacy Act: A Comment, 22 FAM. 
L. Q. 145 (1988). The Act leaves open a number of important questions. Is $7,500 the base fee, or might a 
lower fee be acceptable? Why would the cost sometimes be $7,500, and other times $12,500? Is the fee set on 
a case by case basis, or categorically? Would it be acceptable for intended parents to pay a premium for certain 
types of surrogates, like those who are young, have good dietary habits, are in particularly good health, or are 
of a particular race or ethnicity?  
83 A.B.A, MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (2008), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/family_law_quarterly/family_flq_artmodelact.aut
hcheckdam.pdf. The Act also includes detailed eligibility criteria for both surrogates and intended parents. 
84 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’N ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §§ 801-
809 (2017), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/2016AM_AmendedParentage_Draft.pdf.  
85 Id. 
22 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 44 NO. 1 2018 
 
Hague Conference on Private International Law convened an Experts Group to study 
the private international law issues raised by surrogacy, particularly those involving 
fundamental human rights included in the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child—
nationality, immigration status, and parentage.86 At the request of the U.S. Department 
of State, the ABA weighed in on the merits of drafting a new Convention on 
international surrogacy, and argued forcefully against doing so.87 Citing the importance 
of “local culture and concerns” over surrogacy, the ABA argued that it would be 
inappropriate to support the creation of uniform rules for regulating surrogacy in 
different countries.88 With the U.S. opposing efforts to harmonize national surrogacy 
laws, one can expect little progress on that front.  
The 30th anniversary of the Baby M case thus stands as a stark reminder of how 
little progress has been made in shaping consistent and coherent laws to regulate 
surrogacy. In the three decades since the Supreme Court of New Jersey issued its 
decision, reproductive medicine has rapidly evolved, and social norms as well as formal 
laws have redefined the meaning of marriage and family. Yet state courts and 
legislatures remain divided in their views of surrogacy, and those seeking to have 
children through surrogacy continue to operate in a climate of grave uncertainty. For 
now, one can only greet the anniversary of Baby M with a mixture of humility and 
disappointment; humility because the choices people make about bearing children are 
always so deeply complex and personal, and disappointment because despite profound 
changes in science and society, legal uncertainty about surrogacy has persisted for 30 
years, and is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. 
                                                     
86 The Parentage/Surrogacy Project, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/parentage-surrogacy [https://perma.cc/DTH8-VFA9]. 
87 A.B.A., RESOLUTION, SECTION OF FAMILY LAW SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, TRUST AND 
ESTATES LAW, SECTION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/family/Hague_Consideration.authcheckdam.p
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88 It did, however, voice support for the determination of parentage based on intent, which it saw 
as an important step in harmonizing laws involving parentage and citizenship. Id. 
